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In this paper, we model competition between legal and pirate products. In our framework, the 
government affects this competition through police spending and taxes on legal products. 
Therefore, the government can choose the combination of spending and taxes that best fits its 
goals. We find that governments that focus entirely on eradicating piracy use lower levels of 
taxes and police spending than governments that focus on maximizing consumption, consumer 
surplus, welfare or government size. This result highlights the importance of demand side 
policies in the fight against piracy and posts a challenge to the traditional solo approach of 
supply side policies. 
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The growing scale of piracy has become a major concern for governments around the world 
and media industry managers. The continuous violation of international Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) laws in developing countries scares away investment from multinational firms, 
resulting in lower growth and consumption paths. Similarly, domestic piracy lowers the return 
on investment of firms in the media industry, driving firms out of business and eventually 
lowering industry revenues and increasing unemployment. 
Even though piracy in the movie industry has existed for many years (through home-made 
copies of video tapes), this has increased lately with the appearance of DVDs and the Internet 
(pirate DVDs and Internet downloads). Similarly, the music industry has also suffered the effect 
of piracy: according to the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), global 
sales increased in the ’90s from US$24.1 billion to US$38.6 billion. Nevertheless, global sales 
fell 5% in 2000, 8.8% in 2001 and 7.1% in 2002, reaching a low of US$30.9 billion (Zentner, 
2004). 
Although Internet piracy has received most publicity in this matter (due to the Napster case), 
there are other types of piracy that are at least as important as Internet piracy. An example 
would be illegal street sales (IFPI, 2001, 2002). This has been an important problem all around 
the world (it is easier to find any given CD in the streets of Bangkok than it is to find it in a 
music store in the same city). For example, the Sociedad General de Autores y Editores (SGAE, 
Spanish body that looks after the interests of authors) reports that Spanish music sales went 
down by 17 million CDs due to illegal street sales. This means that artists collected 10 million 
euros less than they should have, while record companies collected 150 million euros less. Even 
though this effect has decreased in size recently, it is still big and has raised many concerns 
among artists and media entertainment companies. 
In response to these concerns, governments around the world have established different policies 
to protect artists’ IPR and so preserve the incentives for intellectual creation and technological 
innovation. These policies have focused mainly on prosecuting those who benefit from piracy 
and raising awareness among potential buyers as to the effects of piracy on the producers of 
entertainment, the artists. Only very recently, there has been a proposal to decrease the sales 
tax on these products as a way to make pirate copies less competitive. As yet, we know very 
little about the effectiveness of these policies, individually or in combination, in lowering the  
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level of music piracy. This paper is intended to shed light on what would be the optimal policy 
to protect IPR. 
To study this problem, we use an extension of the Shaked and Sutton (1982) model as our 
framework. In this extension, we limit the number of products to two: legal and pirate products. 
These two products compete directly with each other and have different qualities (legal products 
have higher quality) and different production technologies. We assume that legal producers 
have a fixed cost of production and linear marginal cost, whereas pirate producers face only a 
linear marginal cost of production, which is presumed to be lower than the marginal cost of 
legal producers. The two products also differ in their respective competitive environment. Legal 
producers are monopolistic, while producers of pirate products face perfect competition. We 
believe these assumptions resemble reality and therefore should not alter our interpretation of 
the results. 
In addition to modeling the private sector, we model the public sector and its interaction with 
the private producers (both legal and pirate producers). The government can affect market 
outcomes through two channels: sales tax and spending. Sales tax affects only legal products, 
while government spending affects the probability of pirate products being confiscated and so 
reduces the expected profitability of such products. The government must balance the use of 
these two channels to achieve its desired goals. In this paper, we examine five different types of 
goals a government may have in dealing with piracy as modelled: maximize total consumption 
regardless of the product type; maximize consumer surplus; maximize society welfare; 
maximize government size (tax revenue); or minimize piracy. 
We find, not surprisingly, that different goals lead to different types of policy with respect to 
sales taxes and government spending. Governments that aim to maximize consumer surplus or 
society welfare impose higher taxes and spend more on monitoring than do governments that 
aim to maximize consumption or tax revenues. Finally, governments that aim only to eliminate 
piracy regardless of everything else impose the lowest taxes and have the lowest levels of 
spending. These results suggest that if governments are worried mainly about the long-term 
effects of piracy on current innovation and therefore want to minimize the incidence of piracy, 
they should rely more on demand side policies than on supply side policies. This goes against 
the traditional government approach, which has never involved the use of taxes (or other 
demand shifters) as a tool to fight piracy. Results here also suggest that governments must 
balance the two channels to achieve their goals. Balancing the two channels is important 
because governments face a trade-off: if a government decides to fight piracy by increasing 
police spending, it may increase taxes to finance that extra spending; but the tax increase will 
make pirate products more attractive to consumers, as legal products will now be more 
expensive. 
This paper contributes to an existing literature on the economics of IPR policies (Varian, 2005; 
Klein, Lerner and Murphy, 2002). The distinctive feature of this paper is that government 
decisions are modelled explicitly and are included in the competitive interaction between legal 
and pirate products. Therefore, this is a purely theoretical paper that has no direct application 
to existing data sets, despite the fact that we obtain several policy implications and 
recommendations. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, I present the literature review. In 
section 3, I introduce the theoretical model used in the paper. Section 4 unravels the theoretical 
implications of the model. In section 5, I compare outcomes across different types of goals that 
a government may target. Finally, section 6 concludes and provides policy implications.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 3 
2. Literature Review 
This paper contributes to two recent streams of the Economics literature. Both literatures treat 
the emergence of piracy in the world. They differ in that while one treats this problem from a 
theoretical point of view, the other examines it from an empirical perspective and focuses on 
different realizations of the piracy problem. 
Most of the papers in this part of the literature take as a reference seminal papers on product 
differentiation. Examples are Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Wauthy (1996). This paper is no 
different and takes Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Tirole (1991) as main references. Another paper 
that uses this framework to analyze the market for legal and pirate products is Grgeta (2004). 
Grgeta models the interaction between original and copied products in a dynamic, horizontally 
and vertically differentiated market. Another paper is Blackburn (2002), where network 
externalities are introduced in the study of original and copied goods. Blackburn finds, not 
surprisingly, that a monopolist should only allow casual copying in the presence of large network 
externality effects. Our paper differs from Grgeta (2004) and Blackburn (2005) in that we focus on 
government intervention in these markets and not on private sector decisions. Very recently, 
Varian (2005) has surveyed the literature and describes some of the insights from previous work. 
He proposes that a combination of free content policy and traditional copyright policy should be 
sufficient to satisfy society’s demand for information goods. 
Most of these papers are a direct consequence of the current intellectual debate on the extent of 
protection of intellectual property rights. Lessig (2004) is a clear example of the existing debate 
on what is the optimal degree of intellectual protection and the side benefits of the “free 
dissemination of culture”. Other examples of this debate are Besen and Raskind (1991), Dam 
(1999), Slive and Bernhart (1998), Takeyama (1994, 1997), Klein, Lerner and Murphy (2002), 
and Romer (2002). 
To the best of my knowledge, we can divide the empirical literature on this topic in two broad 
groups: papers discussing on-line piracy and illegal downloads through file-sharing, and papers 
treating all other types of piracy. The first group of papers received a lot of attention due to the 
importance of the Napster case. Fine (2000) and Landes and Lichtman (2003) provide direct 
discussion of the case. The main (and almost the only) empirical papers in this area are Zentner 
(2004), Blackburn (2005), OberhoIzer and Strumpf (2004) and Rob and Waldfogel (2004). 
Zentner (2004) uses a European cross-section data set to estimate the effect of music downloads 
on purchasing probability. He finds that peer-to-peer usage reduces the probability of purchases 
by 30%. Blackburn (2005) examines the effect of on-line downloads on music retail sales and 
finds that on-line downloads work as demand advertisements for small artists, but as demand 
substitutes for big artists. Rob and Waldfogel (2004) collect data on album purchase and 
download, and find that each download decreases purchases by 0.2. They also find, thanks to 
valuation data, that downloading decreases expenditure and increases the welfare of those 
downloading (not of the musicians, of course). Finally, OberhoIzer and Strumpf (2004) find that 
downloading has no statistical nor significant economic impact on music purchases. This 
evidence goes against all the other papers described before and certainly leaves the door open 
to new papers that can help answer the larger question of what is the appropriate level of 
property rights protection.
1  
                                              
1 There are, of course, other papers treating the Napster case and related issues. Examples are Fine (2000) and 
Liebowitz (2003a, 2003b, 2004).  
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The second group provides evidence from piracy other than on-line downloads. Examples of 
these are Chen and Png (2004) or Hui and Png (2003). Chen and Png (2004) document how 
legalization of parallel imports reduces CD prices by 7.2%. Hui and Png (2003) estimate losses 
from piracy to be lower than claimed by the industry. They add the result that in the absence of 
piracy, prices would have increased. Therefore, losses in revenue are larger than actual losses. 
From a more general perspective, Hann, Hui, Lee and Png (2002) estimate the value of on-line 
information privacy. 
As commented above, our paper is among the first to model explicitly the role of the 
government in the provision of policies to protect intellectual property rights. Examining the 
trade-offs that the government must take into account when designing policies and depicting 
how different policies manifest in tax levels and government spending are the goals of this 
paper. 
3. Theoretical Model 
Following the model developed in Tirole (1991),
2 we model individuals with a utility function 
such that 
U = θs − p 
where θ is the quality of the product consumed by the individual, s is the individual’s taste for 
quality and p is the price paid for the product. We assume that there are 2 different types of 
products, legal and illegal products, which have different quality levels θ2 (legal) and θ1 (illegal). 
We assume also that θ 2 > θ 1.
3 Given this notation, the legal product will have a price of p2 and 
the illegal product will have a price p1. We also assume that the population’s taste for quality is 
uniformly distributed such that s
~U[0,k]. Finally, for simplicity we assume the population size 
is k. 
Given this characterization, any given individual will choose to consume the legal product over 
the illegal product if 
θ2s − p2 > θ1s − p1 
 
therefore all consumers with taste higher than s* =          will consume the legal product, and 
all those with taste lower than s* will choose to consume the illegal product or not to consume 
at all. If we assume that individuals that do not consume anything obtain 0 utility, then only 
those with taste higher than s’ =       will choose to consume the illegal product over nothing. 
See Figure 1 for a graphical exposition of this. Therefore, legal and illegal products face the 
following demand functions, which we shall call expression (1) and expression (2) 
  (1) 
 
                                              
2 The model in Tirole (1991) is a version of the model in Shaked and Sutton (1982). 
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and 
  (2) 
where ∆θ = θ2 − θ1. 
All said, D1 > 0 if s* > s’, that is, if           >       , or       >     .  These are all well-known results 
in the product differentiation literature and constitute the characterization of the demand side 
in this paper. 
3.1. Public Sector 
In this economy, we assume there is a public sector or government. The government spends a 
fixed amount R on services provided to consumers. The government can also spend a variable 
amount  G on prosecuting crime (producers of illegal products). The more the government 
spends, the higher the probability the government will capture the producers of illegal products. 
This probability depends on G through the function h(G), where h(0) = 0, h(∞) = 1 and h’ > 0, 
h” ≤ 0. 
The government collects a quantity of tax t to finance all its spending G + R. Therefore, when 
the government decides what tax to collect and how much to spend on fighting crime, it has to 
obey a budget constraint such that 
                                                     q2t = G + R   (3) 
where q2 is the quantity of units sold of the legal product. We shall call this government budget 
constraint expression (3). 
Notice that the government can only collect tax revenue from the sale of legal products, as the 
definition of an illegal product entails that its price escapes any government control, including 
taxes. This means that when the government increases its spending G, it will most likely 
increase  q2 and therefore its tax revenues. There is a trade-off between G and t  that the 
government must be aware of: increases in G must be financed through increases in tax 
collection. When this increase in tax collection comes from increasing the tax t, the demand for 
illegal products increases, possibly more than the opposite effect of increasing spending G in 
the first place. 
3.2. Private Sector 
As said before, there are two types of products, legal and illegal ones. Since the aim of the 
paper is to depict ultimately a simplified version of reality, we characterize the legal sector as 
one where a monopolist takes care of all production. This is a plausible assumption since legal 
producers create a new product for which they have monopolistic power. On the other hand, we 
assume that there is perfect competition in the illegal sector and therefore there is firm entry 
until profits are driven down to zero. Once the invention is introduced by the legal monopolist, 
illegal producers instantly get access to a copying technology that allows them to produce an 
imperfect copy of the legal product. This copying technology is accessible by everybody and, 
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We can depict the profit function of the legal firm with expression (4), 
                                               Π2 = D2 (p2)p − C2 (D2 (p2))       (4) 
where p2 = p + t and C2(.) is the cost function of the legal producer. See that the legal producer 
optimally sets p, but t is given exogenously to the legal producer by the government. Similarly, 
the profit function for any of the firms in the illegal sector will be 
                                         Π1 = d1 (p1)p1 [1 − h(G)] − C1 (d1 (p1))   (5) 
which we shall call expression (5). Here d1 is the demand for each firm in the illegal sector, 
C1 (.) is the cost function for each firm, and h(G) is the probability of getting caught by the 
government. If caught, the illegal producer must still pay the cost of production (the goods are 
produced ex ante) and must give away all revenues from the sale.
4 
Even though we describe profit functions above, technology and cost structure need further 
discussion. For simplicity, we assume the cost function of the legal firm will be one such that 
C2 = c2q2 + F 
and that of the illegal firms will be one such that 
C1 = c1q1 
where q2 and q1, are quantities produced by legal and illegal firms respectively, F is the fixed 
cost incurred by the legal firm to create the innovation, and c2 and c1 are marginal costs where 
c2 > c1 due to the lower quality of the illegal product. 
Following the theoretical framework in this section, I examine the interaction of private and 
public sector agents in the following section. We first examine pricing decisions by firms, 
and then we look into the different policies that the government can follow. The optimal policy 
will depend on the ultimate goal of the government. 
4. Theoretical Implications 
In this section we develop the theoretical framework presented in the previous section. We first 
start analyzing the decisions of the private sector, and then we proceed to analyze the decisions 
of the public sector. 
4.1. Private Sector Decisions 
As described above, the illegal sector is perfectly competitive. This means that profit will be 
driven to zero, and therefore we can arrange expression (5) into 
Π1 = d1 (p1)p1 [1 − h(G)] − C1 (d1 (p1)) = 0 
 
                                              
4 Another possibility is to add a fine if captured by the police. Results do not change from the analysis here when the 
government sets a fine per unit of illegal product confiscated. It does not hold if fine size is independent of the 
number of units of illegal product.  
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This equation transforms into 
Π1 = d1 (p1) (p1 [1 − h(G)] − C1) = 0 
when including the cost function described above. We can then find the price for the illegal 
sector such that 
  (6) 
   
We shall call this expression (6). 
On the other hand, the monopolistic legal producer takes into account the price set by the 
illegal producers p1 and the tax t set by the government. From expression (4), we find that the 
legal producer maximizes profits such that 
D2 (p + t)(p − c2) − F 
                                                   
 
where D2 =                   (expression (1) from above). Out of the first order condition of the legal 
producer problem, we obtain expression (7), which defines p in terms of p1 such that 
                                                    
2
2 1 c t p k
p




This means that once we include the equilibrium p1, the equilibrium price is 















This solution establishes that taxes (t), costs (c1 and c2), probability of being caught (h(G)), 
market size (k) and quality differential (∆θ) increase the price charged by the monopolistic legal 
producer.
5 
4.2. Public Sector Decisions 
Once the government knows how firms react to its decisions on sales tax (t) and police 
spending (G), it can set the optimal tax and optimal level of spending that will best achieve its 
goals. Therefore, defining a government’s different types of goals also defines the optimal 
policy.  
We must take into account that the monopolistic legal firm must always obtain positive profit, 
since the illegal sector copies from their invention. This assumption can be relaxed if we think 
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that local pirate producers are copying the products from foreign legal producers. This 
eventually will lead the local legal producers out of business and the illegal producers will 
prevail. 
4.2.1. Maximizing Consumption 
Take the case where the government wants to maximize overall consumption, that is, joint 
consumption of legal and illegal products. This is a case where the government values all 
consumers alike and therefore weighs each of the consumers the same. In that case, the 
government maximizes 
                D1 (p1) + D2 (p2) 
subject to p2 = p + t, and expressions (3), (8) and (6). 













In this particular case, t does not appear in the objective function and it only appears in the 
government budget constraint. On the other hand, G directly affects both the objective function 
and the budget constraint. This conditions the resulting first order conditions. In particular, the 
first order condition with respect to G shows how increases in G directly decrease consumption, 
but it indirectly favors consumption through the budget constraint and the marginal utility of 
government spending λ. In the case of the first order condition with respect to t, the 
maximization problem only maximizes the budget constraint and, therefore, the optimal tax t is 
the tax that maximizes tax revenue for any given G. Therefore, in the consumption maximizing 
case, the government is taxing at the maximum of the Laffer curve for any given G, and we 
can say that the government is over or under-taxing the consumers of legal products. Finally, 
our last first order condition makes sure the optimally chosen G and t are consistent with the 
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4.2.2. Maximizing Surplus 
A second possible case is where government maximizes the consumer surplus. This case differs 
from the first one we analyzed in that the government no longer values all consumers the same. 
Here, the government values more those consumers that have a higher valuation of 
consumption and, therefore, the government will favor them when making decisions on tax and 
expenditure levels. In that case, the government maximizes 
 
 
subject to p2 = p + t , and expressions (3), (8) and (6). 
Note that there will be a share of consumers that choose not to consume any good (we made 
this assumption above). These obtain 0 surplus (utility) from consumption and therefore do not 
enter into the government’s objective function. 














In this case, both t and G affect the objective function directly and indirectly (through the 
budget constraint). We note that when the government maximizes consumer surplus, it is 
implicitly valuing consumers with a high value of consumption more than those with a lower 
value of consumption. Because of this, even with the loss of consumers experienced when G 
increases, and holding tax t constant, there is a benefit to be obtained by increasing spending G 
because more consumers will choose the legal product over the pirate product. On the other 
hand, since t now affects directly both the objective function and the government budget 
constraint, the first order condition with respect to t differs from the one in the consumption-
maximizer government case. Since an increase in tax harms those consumers that value 
consumption the most (consumers of legal products), there is a constant negative effect of an 
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increase in taxes  )
2
3
(− . This constant negative effect is compensated by the marginal effect of 
an increase in taxes on revenue weighted by the marginal utility of government spending λ. 
Notice then that the tax used by this government will differ from the tax that maximizes tax 
revenue for a given G. Again, the last first order condition makes sure that the optimally 
chosen levels of G and t are consistent with the government budget constraint. 
4.2.3. Maximizing Welfare 
The objective function does not differ much from the surplus-maximizing case when the 
government wants to maximize welfare. The objective function will now include the profits of 
the legal and illegal producers. Therefore, the new objective function will be 
 
 
subject to p2 = p + t, and expressions (3), (4), (8) and (6). 
Note that Π1 ( p2,p1)  = 0 since the market for illegal products is assumed to be perfectly 
















Similarly to the previous case, t and G here directly and indirectly affect the welfare objective 
function. In this case, increases in G (first order condition) not only favor consumption of the 
legal product (and therefore increase consumer surplus) but also decrease the competition that 
the legal producer faces. This increases the legal producer’s profits and therefore society’s 
welfare. On the other hand, increases in tax t would reduce society’s welfare through decreases 
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in the legal producer’s profits and a reduction of legal product consumption by consumers with 
a high valuation of consumption. The first order condition above tells us that the net effect of 
increasing tax t is ambiguous and depends on the values of ∆θ, c1, c2 and λ. Similarly to the 
two cases above, the last first order condition makes sure that the optimally chosen t and G 
satisfy the government budget constraint. 
4.2.4. Maximizing Government Size 
A fourth case would be where the politician in charge of making decisions cares about the size 
of the government because that reflects her power in society. Here, the government no longer 
cares about the surplus or consumption of individuals, but only about the revenue collected 
from the legal producer. In such a case, the government will maximize tax revenue such that 
max tD2(p + t) 
subject to p2 = p + t, and expressions (3), (8) and (6). 
Note that in a case like this, the bureaucrat would be involuntarily eliminating piracy since it is 
in her interest to increase the demand for the legal product and diminish the demand for the 
illegal product. 






Hence we obtain the following first order conditions 







See that the solution to this problem needs λ = 0.
6 This result sets the tax first order condition 
equal to that of the government that maximizes consumption. That value, as suggested above, 
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is the value that maximizes tax revenue for any given G. The last first order condition makes 
sure the government budget constraint is binding. 
4.2.5. Minimizing Piracy 
Finally, the government could have an active direct policy to eliminate piracy as much as 
possible. In this case, the government’s only objective would be to minimize the demand for the 
illegal product. This case is analogous to a situation where the government cares about the 
future incentives to innovation, and therefore decides to eradicate current piracy at all costs. 
Here again, the government will pursue its goal regardless of the consequences for consumer 
welfare or the profits of legal producers. Therefore, the government’s minimizing problem 
would become 
min D1(p1) 
subject to p2 = p + t, and expressions (3), (8) and (6). 














  Note that in this case we are minimizing, so we must check that the solution we are 
looking for is actually a minimum and not a maximum.
7 See from the first order condition with 
respect to G that an increase in G is going to reduce demand of the pirate product at decreasing 
rates, whereas a decrease in tax t decreases the demand for pirate goods linearly. Therefore, 
governments minimizing piracy will choose their optimal levels of t and G such that the 
marginal unit of spending G decreases piracy by the same amount as the last unit of tax 
                                              
7 The second order conditions will take positive values as long as λ ≥ 0, which is the case always. 
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revenue collected increases piracy. From the second first order condition, we see that when we 
decrease taxes we decrease piracy (positive factor     ), and therefore the optimal tax t will be 
below the tax level that maximizes tax revenues. As usual, G and t will be such that the 
government budget constraint is binding. 
5. Comparing Policies 
To evaluate and compare the different government policies presented above, we must give a 
definite functional form to h(G). We choose the following function 
 
 
This function fulfills all the initial assumptions about h(G), that is, h(0) = 0, h(∞) = 1, h’ > 0 
and h” < 0. 
Using this function for the probability function h(G) simplifies the first order conditions above 
with respect to government spending G. Despite this simplification and because of the quadratic 
form of the government budget constraint, there is no close solution to G and t for each one of 
the government examples set above.
8 Still, we can analyze the different policies and compare 
them against each other. We do this by comparing objective functions and the first order 
conditions above. 
5.1. Government Spending 
The objective function of the government that maximizes consumption depends negatively on 
the level of spending G                 . That differs from the objective function of the government 
maximizing surplus in that this negative relationship is softened by an extra term that depends 
positively on the level of spending G                           . In this second case, the whole 
objective function would depend positively on G for all values of θ1 > 2. As I mentioned above, 
there is no clear solution to the systems of equations presented in the previous section, but we 
can compare how the different objective functions depend on the level of spending G. When 
comparing governments that maximize consumption and governments that maximize surplus, 
the former’s objective function is more strongly negative related to spending G than the latter’s 





When examining the objective function of the government that maximizes welfare, it is the 
same as that of the government maximizing surplus with the addition of the profit of the legal 
producer. These profits increase with the level of spending G, since government spending 
increases the price of pirate products, harms pirate profits and increases the profits of the legal 
producer. Therefore, this objective function has a stronger positive relationship to G than the 
                                              
8  When substituting into the first order conditions our function for h(G),  G disappears from the first order 
conditions. G does not disappear from the first order conditions with respect to t. This leaves us with one equation 
that solves λ in terms of t and other parameters of the model, one equation that sets t in terms of G and possibly λ, 
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The objective function of the government maximizing tax revenue is the least definite of all. It 
contains only one term depending on                 . This term is positively dependent on G, but 
we cannot compare it with respect to the terms found in the objective functions of the 





Finally, the objective function of the government minimizing piracy depends negatively on G, 
even more strongly than the objective function of  the  government  maximizing  consumption   
                                     . Therefore, the level of spending G of such government will be lower 
than that of the government maximizing consumption. 












5.2. Consumption Tax 
Even though we do not have close solutions, we can say much more about taxes by looking at 
the first order conditions of maximizing the respective objective functions with respect to the 













c is the optimal tax profile if the government maximizes consumption, t
s the tax profile 
if the government maximizes consumer surplus, t
w the tax profile when the government 
maximizes welfare, t
r the optimal tax profile if the government maximizes tax revenue, and t
p 
the optimal tax profile when the government minimizes piracy. 
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From comparing these five different optimal tax profiles, we can see that holding expenditure G 














Our third inequality holds as long as λ > 1. This will always be the case because a value λ ≤ 1 
will yield negative tax values and in this paper we do not consider the case where the 
government offers subsidies for consumption of legal products. 
6. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the competition between legal and pirate products. In this paper this 
competition is influenced by the government through taxes on legal products and spending on 
the prosecution of illegal products. The former favors pirate products and the latter favors legal 
products. Despite the fact that governments tend to design policies that favor legal products, 
government spending needs to be financed through taxes and therefore the government faces a 
trade-off between the two instruments. 
As we can see from our results above, the optimal level of spending and taxes varies from 
policy to policy. Despite these discrepancies across policies, there are some general results that 
are equal across policies. We find that taxes on legal products increase the higher ∆θ, the 
higher c1 and the lower c2. All three conditions state that in more advantageous situations for 
the legal producer, it is optimal for the government to set a higher level of taxes regardless of 
the goal it is pursuing. 
We find differences across policies. Policies where the government maximizes consumer surplus 
or society welfare require the highest level of taxes and spending. Policies targeting the 
minimization of piracy require the lowest levels of taxes and spending. Finally, policies aimed 
at maximizing consumption (regardless of whether it is legal or pirate production) or tax 
revenue require a medium level of taxes and spending. 
If we consider that the value that maximizes tax revenue regardless of the budget constraint is 
t
r and t
c, then we can compare all the other values to these two and determine under which 
regimes the government is taxing too much or too little and therefore obtaining less tax 
revenue than it would with t
r and t
c. In this case, since t
s and t
w are higher than t
r and t
c, we 
can affirm that the government is imposing higher taxes and still collecting less money. 
Similarly, since t
p is lower than t
r and t
c, we can affirm that the government is imposing less 
taxes and collecting less money. Even though the latter assertion makes perfect sense, the 
former is in direct contradiction with our previous findings on the level of spending. These two 
contradictory results are only consistent with each other if the higher level of spending 
diminishes the demand for the pirate product to the point where the increase in demand for the 
legal product is greater than the decrease in demand due to the increase in tax. See a graphical 
representation of this explanation in Figure 2. Here the increase in G bumps up the Laffer curve 
and increases tax revenue per unit of tax. Unfortunately, this increase in G must be financed  
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with an increase in t and the government faces a trade-off between tax revenue (G) and 
efficient taxation (t higher than the maximum point in the Laffer curve). This occurs because an 
extra unit of spending G increases the demand of legal products by less than one unit, and 
therefore the government must increase tax levels to finance such spending increase. 
These results denote that different government goals require different level of taxes and 
spending. Therefore, from our results we can say that when governments are most concerned to 
eliminate piracy so as to provide incentives for future inventions or foreign licensing, the best 
tool to achieve such a goal is to lower taxes and act through the demand side (consumption 
tax) and not through the supply side (spending on police). This goes against the traditional 
approach where governments tend to use only measures to restrict the supply through the 
increase of regulation and spending towards the monitoring of such new regulation. Varian 
(2005) specifies very clearly that when the cost of sharing is very low (as it is on the Internet or 
in street sales), piracy will emerge naturally. In such a case, not even regulation or policing will 
deter the emergence of demand for pirate products. 
Interestingly the results obtained here denote that a government more interested in increasing 
future consumption will have the lowest level of taxes and spending. By doing this, 
governments eradicate piracy and foster innovation, which will increase future consumption. 
This changes when the government is more concerned about consumer surplus and society 
welfare. This is because there is a shift of preferences from consumers with low consumption 
value to consumers with high consumption value and firms’ profits. This is consistent with 
well-spread evidence that poor countries have less incisive policies on IPR protection. 
Therefore, these low-income countries could even be acting optimally. 
In conclusion, this paper analyzes the need for coordination between demand and supply 
policies when governments try to prevent the emergence of pirate markets and foster invention 
of new products in the future that will ultimately speed overall economic growth. Results in the 
paper suggest that policies valuing high-value consumers and firms’ profits will tend to rely 
more on supply side policies (increase spending on monitoring policies), while policies targeting 
the elimination of piracy will tend to rely more on demand side policies (reducing taxes on 
legal products). Policies aimed at maximizing tax revenue (due to political aspirations of 
government officials) or maximizing society’s consumption (regardless of the value of 
consumption) will balance their use of taxes and spending and will use medium levels of each. 
Future extensions of this research should involve the treatment of time and international 
borders. In this paper, we use a static model to study the interactions between legal and pirate 
products in a world with differentiated products. Including the dimension of time in a setting 
like this is the next step. Doing so we would observe how the incentives to innovation and 
production vary as the importance of piracy changes. Similarly, most of the inventions in the 
world occur in a few countries, which license away these innovations to other countries that do 
not have the resources to produce the innovations themselves. Future research should model the 
possibility of observing innovation abroad and within the same country and study how piracy 
abroad and within the same country affects innovation incentives. These are important 
questions that fall outside the main scope of this paper, and that therefore we can only hope to 
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Figure 1 
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